This paper advances a new framework for analysing agrarian change in rural China and elsewhere in developing Asia, which centres on translocal family reproduction. The framework highlights the crucial connections between rural families' translocal strategies for meeting reproductive, especially care needs, their changing aspirations for reproduction, and other aspects of agrarian change, including de-peasantization, de-agrarianization and social differentiation. In developing this framework, the paper refers to a village case study in central China, and draws on a critique of the 'livelihoods perspective' on agrarian change, and approaches focusing on 'global householding,' and the cultural reproduction of class and gender.
in other counties and provinces in China and 200 overseas. Almost everyone aged 18-40 years had spent many years working away from home, including at least one year overseas.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s, many more men migrated out of Gingko village than women, but with increases in employment opportunities for migrant women, this changed. Already by the late 1990s, most adults of both sexes under the age of 50 were spending most of the year in non-agricultural waged employment away from home. The majority, however, left their small children and ageing parents behind. With rural, non-local household registration (hukou), their citizenship rights in urban areas, including the right to social welfare and education for their children, were curtailed, and living costs were prohibitively high. This was particularly the case in the largest metropolises and between the 1980s and early 2000s. Since then, hukou restrictions have eased, making it much easier and cheaper for rural migrant families to live in small towns and cities. However, in the larger metropolises, where employment opportunities are more plentiful and lucrative, it remains prohibitively expensive for migrants to settle (Jacka, Kipnis and Sargeson 2013, 65-81) .
With the advent of large-scale labour outmigration, understandings about 'productive' and 'reproductive' work shifted, and among those remaining in the village, new patterns of work and divisions of labour emerged. In the 1980s, there was a 'feminization' of agriculture, with women becoming an increasingly large proportion of the agricultural labour force (cf. Jacka 1997, 128-40) . Then, from the 1990s, with more and more young and middle-aged women as well as men leaving the village, there was an 'ageing' of agriculture, with responsibility for farm work being devolved onto men and women of increasingly advanced age. Meanwhile, care work was undertaken primarily by older women.
Reproductive work
For the last twenty to thirty years, most small children have been raised almost entirely by their grandparents, especially grandmothers, who have taken over childcare responsibilities so young women can undertake migrant waged work. As a consequence, many of today's elderly women have devoted a very large part of their lives to raising children. Sixty-twoyear-old Mrs Li, for example, has raised ten children; three sons of her own, and all of her sons' seven children. 8 She raised each grandchild from the age of just a couple of months until they were 5-10 years old. Of course, many grandmothers have both multiple grandchildren, and frail parents and parents-in-law in need of care. These women are the backbone of the family economy, shouldering the greatest responsibility for care work as well as engaging in agriculture.
Over the years, the declining profitability of agriculture relative to non-agricultural employment, the consequent loss of labour power to migrant waged work, and the burden of care work shouldered by the depleted population left behind have led to major changes in agriculture, including shifts in the type of crops grown, a sharp reduction in the number of livestock raised, and a shrinkage in the amount of land farmed by most families. For the majority, agriculture has shifted from being mostly 'productive' to primarily 'reproductive'
work. The changes have been particularly noticeable since the mid-2000s. Finding it too difficult to grow rice for the market, and faced with a growing scarcity of hired labour, an increasingly large proportion of the left-behind have stopped irrigating their paddy land.
Some of the non-irrigated land they plant with less labour-intensive crops of peanuts and canola, primarily for family consumption, and the rest they leave uncultivated.
However, this retreat from market-oriented farming among the majority has eased the way for an alternative response to the declining profitability of agriculture among a minority.
Thus, a few villagers have expanded their farming, cultivating paddy land no longer farmed by those to whom it was contracted, as well as their own, in most cases without remuneration.
Most have farmed no more than an additional couple of mu, but one household has added 100 mu to the land they cultivate. In addition, in 2013-2014, an external entrepreneur leased 200 mu, or 19 percent of the village's paddy land, consolidating it into large fields. He signed 20-year leases with village households, paying them an annual pittance of 300 yuan 9 per mu.
Some elderly farmers refused to lease out their land, but most, unable to farm it themselves, did so willingly (cf. Trappel 2016, 81-99).
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Changing aspirations
The older generation's reproductive work has enabled youth engagement in migrant employment, which in turn has increased family incomes. As a result, while it continues to be officially labelled a 'poor village,' many villagers are anything but poor. 11 Improvements in incomes have been further bolstered by redistributive policies introduced nationally from the mid-2000s. These include the removal of agricultural taxes and of tuition fees for nine years' compulsory education; the introduction of a new cooperative medical insurance scheme and a minimum livelihood guarantee system of welfare payments; and the rolling-out of a basic pension scheme for all rural residents over the age of 60 (Leung and Xu 2015, 98-124 indicates their wealth and social status, and consequently, a substantial new house or apartment is a must for any young man seeking to marry (cf. Murphy 2009, 57-58) .
Investment in housing, in other words, is a key strategy for the reproduction of the patrilineal family. Over the last several years, the new housing has been getting more lavish, and often has been bought in New County city, about 40 minutes' drive from the village. 12 However, most of the new buildings' interiors are unfinished, and at least a third are empty, with migrant labourers continuing to live and work elsewhere for several years before being able to afford interior work and furnishings.
In addition, families' concerns about reproduction of the next generation have led them to invest more in children's education, with consequences also for women's work. Until recently, most children stayed with their grandparents and undertook their first few years of education in the Gingko village primary school (which included pre-school and grades 1-3), and the neighbouring village primary school (pre-school to grade 5). Those who continued went to boarding school in the local township or in New County city. In the mid-2010s, however, a new trend emerged, with mothers, who left their babies with grandparents to become long-distance migrant waged labourers, returning when it came time for the children to go to school. They rented or bought an apartment in New County city, and during the week, they and their children lived there, so the children could attend a better-quality urban school.
Scholars have termed these women peidu mama, literally 'mums who accompany [their children] to school' (Ye, Pan and He 2014, 40).
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The peidu mama phenomenon, which is increasingly widespread across China, is partially a response to state educational policy and to anxieties about educational, health, safety and emotional problems among left-behind children. In recent years, the state has sought to rationalize educational funding by removing resources from small village primary schools and centralizing them in larger village and township schools, many of which have boarding facilities. The primary school in the village neighbouring Gingko is one such centralized school. Policy makers view centralized boarding schools as an answer to concerns about ageing grandparents' difficulties keeping lively young children from drowning in local fish ponds, for example, and their inability to discipline them and help them complete homework (Murphy 2014, 35) . However, Gingko parents complain that the quality of education in the neighbouring village and the township schools, while better than in Gingko village, cannot compare with that offered in city schools. They also worry about the high costs of boarding, and about the wellbeing of children, both in boarding school and while they are at home on weekends in the village.
Between 2013 and 2015, the number of children attending the Gingko village school declined from 100 to ten. In 2015, there were 190 peidu mama from Gingko village living in New County city with their children. Many took their children back to the village once or twice a fortnight to check in with their parents-in-law and help with farming. However, some grandparents, especially grandmothers, also spent part of their time in New County city, helping out with care work. This helped some young mothers find income-generating work, though very few found jobs that made them as much as they previously earned as migrant labourers.
Changes in the family
Changes in the divisions of labour and forms of cooperation that Gingko family members adopt in their efforts to meet reproductive needs have been accompanied by shifts in the relationship between the household and the family, and renegotiations of the roles and status of women, and the relationship between generations (cf. Fan 2015, 198-200 does not appear to garner the elderly respect or appreciation within the family. Instead, a failure to provide childcare is quite often used by sons and daughters-in-law to justify a refusal to provide financial support for the older generation as they age. At the same time, some parents criticise grandparents, for example, for being 'dirty' or for not disciplining children. For their part, grandparents often express shame at the 'inadequacy' of their contribution to the younger generation, and try to minimise the 'burden' they impose on them, for example, by not seeking medical treatment, for which they would need their adult children to pay (cf. Santos, 2016) .
One reason for the shift in the mother-daughter-in-law relationship is the fact that women becoming adults in the last few decades are more educated and worldly, and earn higher incomes than the older generation. But women still earn less than men. This gender differential has been a key consideration underpinning the feminization of agriculture, women's rather than men's dominance in care work, and most recently, the peidu mama phenomenon. In turn, women's relative lack of income increases their dependence on husbands, sons and others, and reduces their autonomy and bargaining power relative to men in the family.
In addition to these broad historical shifts, over their life-course, villagers are now moving physically and experiencing shifts in their work-roles and responsibilities far more often than in previous decades. This flux is enabled and accompanied by change in the institution of the family, and a high degree of variation between dominant family values and actual behaviour and relationships. Again, this is particularly obvious in regards to care work and the relationship between women in the family. In line with the dominant institution of the patrilineal family, the ideal is for older people, especially women, to care for their sons'
grandchildren, but not their daughters.' And in turn, as they become too old to manage on their own, the elderly are expected to live with and be taken care of by sons and their wives, not daughters. In reality though, many older women are continually on the move, providing care and being cared for by a range of different family members, in ways not always in accordance with patrilineal ideals. The daughter-in-law is much closer to her own mother, who lives in another part of the village, visiting her several times a week. She gives her mother more financial support and help with farm work than either of her two brothers, or her sister.
Social differentiation
Young people's outmigration, and consequent improvements in their incomes and changes in their aspirations, have also fed into processes of social differentiation, exacerbating inequalities both between Gingko families and within them. There are a number of very old residents of Gingko village like Mr Zhou, whom other villagers describe as 'pitiful' because they live alone and their adult children rarely visit. They rarely describe themselves as such. In some cases, this appears to be because they feel ashamed of their children's lack of filiality. In others, it seems to relate to 'descending familism,' whereby the elderly themselves accept a family prioritisation of younger generations' needs and wellbeing over their own. Descending familism is further discussed below.
Gingko and point to a new form of differentiation between generations. Up-and-coming young and middle-aged villagers are investing in themselves and the next generation far more than they are giving back to the previous generation.
Summary
This case study illustrates trends in translocal family reproduction that are central to the dynamics of agrarian change in villages across China. First, reproductive work, especially the work of older family members in subsistence agriculture and in meeting care needs, is crucial to the rural economy, for it enables large-scale labour outmigration among the young and middle-aged. In addition, reproductive needs and aspirations, particularly the need to care for dependants, especially children, and to provide for the family's future, are a major driver of rural families' economic behaviour. This is commonly not fully appreciated by scholars of agrarian change. Jan Douwe van der Ploeg and colleagues, for example, describe the 'split family' approach to migration as shaped by efforts to balance the short-term financial gains of migrant waged employment against a longer-term cultural commitment to the land and farming and a desire for the security they provide. 'The, oft-articulated, thesis that migrant work represents a definitive adieu to [small family] farming,' they suggest, 'is a fallacy,' for rural families continue to invest in the land, and young migrant labourers remain attached, and consequently return, to farming in middle and old age (Van der Ploeg et al. 2014,172) . Gingko village suggests a different story. Rather than attempting to balance the financial gains of migrant labour against a need to maintain farming, Gingko families are balancing migrant wage incomes against the fulfilment of care needs. In the resultant strategies, very small-scale subsistence farming is important as a source of food security for left-behind carers, most of whom have low cash incomes. However, little investment is made in paddy land and rice farming for the market is . These studies all find that highly dynamic intra-family gender and intergenerational relations are a corollary of the shifts that occur in families' strategies for accomplishing reproductive work in the wake of capitalist development, especially increases in labour mobility.
Finally, the Gingko case study shows that transformations in rural family reproduction are intimately connected with changes in a range of policies, structures, and social institutions at local, national and global levels. In existing studies of migration in Asia, the translocal split family strategy commonly is viewed as shaped by policies and structures, such as China's household registration system, which compound socio-economic inequalities between places of migrant origin and destination, and make migrant family settlement away from the place of origin untenable (Fan 2015, 194-95) . The above case study shows, though, that in rural China, in addition to the household registration system, various other state policies have an important impact on translocal family reproduction. For example, the peidu mama phenomenon and village children's education in urban schools are, on the one hand, partially enabled by the removal of tuition fees for compulsory education, as well as other improvements in rural income resulting from the removal of agricultural taxes and the introduction of welfare schemes. In addition, the state's implementation of family planning policies from the late 1970s reduced the number of children born, thus increasing the resources available for investment in each child's education. On the other hand, the enrolment of village children in urban schools is also partially a response to problems caused by the state's closure of small village schools and concentration of educational resources in larger population centres.
Furthermore, global social and political-economic trends must be taken into account, because, for one thing, opportunities and demand for rural migrant labour (overseas and within China) are highly dependent on the vicissitudes of the global economy. For another, increased exposure to transnational consumer cultures via migration, television and, most recently, the internet has an important role in shaping aspirations for family reproduction in villages such as Gingko.
To date, scholarship on agrarian change in Asia has been dominated by two analytical approaches: a Marxist structuralist approach, and a 'livelihoods perspective,' focusing on rural households' livelihood strategies. Concentrating on the micro-level, the latter approach has more potential for understanding shifts in family reproduction of the kind found in Gingko village, but is nevertheless seriously limited. The next part of the paper outlines its main limitations before reviewing two other approaches to social and political-economic change, relating to 'global householding' and the cultural reproduction of class and gender.
Neither of these approaches has previously been adopted in the mainstream literature on agrarian change in Asia. Each has advantages over the livelihoods perspective, but nevertheless requires modification for understanding the nexus between shifts in translocal family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change.
Livelihoods, global householding, and the cultural reproduction of class and gender
For our purposes, the most obvious limitation of studies taking the livelihoods perspective is that they understand 'livelihood strategies' very narrowly, in terms of households' efforts to generate an income. Household members' concerns about and efforts to meet reproductive needs, especially the need to care for dependants, are usually neglected in analyses of livelihood strategies (Zhang and Locke 2010, 54-55) .
Less obviously, perhaps, these studies tend to be limited by the assumption that rural households' aims for family reproduction are essentially universal and static, relating only to the fulfilment of basic needs. They generally fail to appreciate that with economic and social development, come various new, increased aspirations for family reproduction, which drive further changes in families' economic behaviour.
A final set of limitations of the livelihoods perspective relates to its focus on the household. First of all, in the context of rural China, it makes more sense to focus on 'the family' rather than the 'household.' Historically, the Chinese term 'household' (hu) refers to a group of kin, usually a nuclear or stem family, who live together and share a budget, and for administrative purposes, are registered as belonging to the same place of residence. The term 'the family' (jia) refers to a group of close kin, whose members may or may not belong to the same household. For centuries, the majority of rural Chinese families have been patrilocal and patrilineal, and practices aimed at reproducing the patriline have been at the heart of rural Chinese society and culture. As illustrated in the Gingko village case study, today, most villagers' household strategies continue to be at least partially motivated by concern for the reproduction of the broader, patrilineal family as well as the household, and are characterized by forms of cooperation and divisions of labour that span multiple households. As discussed, however, there also have been significant changes in the meanings associated with both 'the household' and 'the family', in the relationships between members of the two, and in the practices through which they are formed and reproduced. These shifts are an important, constitutive element in agrarian change, which cannot be captured with the household livelihoods perspective.
A further problem with the focus on the household is that it is simultaneously too 'micro' and not micro enough. On the one hand, studies with a livelihoods perspective often neglect the connections between livelihoods and macro-level (i.e., global, national and local) state policies and structures, and social institutions (Scoones 2009, 180) . On the other hand, beyond noting gender constraints on women's productive activities, they commonly pay insufficient attention to the intra-family gender and intergenerational politics shaping family members' involvement in and determination of livelihood strategies (Zhang and Locke 2010, 54).
We turn next to studies of 'global householding' as an answer to at least some of the limitations of the livelihoods perspective.
Global householding
Studies of migration, global households and global householding, many of them undertaken in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, have played a key part in the recent renaissance in feminist interest in social reproduction under global capitalism (Kofman 2012 ).
To take one example, Maliha Safri and Julie Graham define the global household as comprising geographically dispersed kin and non-kin, who are linked and may be described as a single entity because of ties of economic and emotional interdependence and structures of decision-making or governance (Safri and Graham 2010, 107) . They argue for a focus on 'household production,' especially non-market oriented production of domestic and caring services by household members, as a cornerstone in a feminist, postcapitalist international political economy, which understands contemporary economies around the world as being constituted by the interrelations between a heterogenous and shifting array of capitalist and noncapitalist transactions and modes of production (Safri and Graham 2010, 103) .
Somewhat similarly, for Mike Douglass, the household -which 'may consist of fictive as well as actual kin, of distant as well as under-the-roof members, and of hired domestic helpers and nannies who become household members' -is 'the foundation of the world economy' (Douglass 2006, 421) . He uses the term 'householding' to highlight the fact that creating and sustaining a household is an ongoing, dynamic process of social reproduction. The typical elements of householding, Douglass suggests, include marriage or other partnering; bearing, raising and educating children; maintaining the household on a daily basis; dividing labour and pooling income from livelihood activities; and caring for elderly and other non-working household members. With his focus on global householding, he emphasizes that, with globalization, these activities are increasingly reliant on the movement of people, and transactions among household members originating from or residing in more than one nation (Douglass 2006, 423) . Further to this, they highlight the fact that in Vietnam's recent history, as in China's, there have been several instances when the value of symbolic capital is radically redefined by market and state actors, and citizens must employ new strategies in order to attain and maintain social status and 'distinction' (Nguyen-Marshall 2012, 10-11) .
Scholars of the middle class in Asia also commonly draw on the work of feminist scholars, who argue for the intimate connections between the production and reproduction of gender identities and the formation of class cultures and patterns of distinction and differentiation. In analysing gender and power in 'affluent' East and Southeast Asia, for example, Krishna Sen and colleagues (1998) draw on work by the historians, Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall (1987) , which highlights the centrality of ideologies and practices linking femininity and domesticity in the creation of the middle class in nineteenth century England.
The majority of studies examining the cultural reproduction of gender and class in Asia are focused on the rise of an urban middle class; very few examine rural societies.
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Most, furthermore, seek to chart the contours of new gender and class identities that are emerging, especially among the young, and say little about differences between generations or the broader dynamics of change through which new identities emerge and to which they contribute. Nevertheless, studies such as this provide leads on how feminist and Bourdieusian social theory could make a contribution to understandings of the relationship between shifts in rural family reproduction and other aspects of agrarian change, specifically social differentiation in the rural population. Beyond illustrating the value of particular concepts, especially 'habitus' and 'distinction,' these studies are valuable for their focus on culture, and their attention to the ways in which class, gender and other power relations and forms of differentiation are shaped by social actors' socially constructed, 'subjective' desires and aspirations, as well as by 'objective' economic factors.
A new analytical framework
We can now sketch out a new framework for studying agrarian change in contexts, such as in contemporary rural China, characterized by high levels of mobility, which both adjusts for limitations in the approaches outlined above, and further develops their strengths. This framework centres around shifts in translocal family reproduction. Within the framework, four interlocking issues are identified as key to analysis of the relationship between shifts in 15 See, however, works by Wei (2015) and Yin (2015) , which draw on Bourdieu to examine class reproduction and distinction in rural Zhejiang, China's wealthiest province. Also relevant to this paper are studies by Ye With this framework, I take an actor-oriented approach to agrarian change, with the understanding that although it may be true that important structural changes result from the impact of outside forces (due to encroachment by the market, state or international bodies), it is theoretically unsatisfactory to base one's analysis on the concept of external determinations. All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing lifeworlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way they are mediated and transformed by these same actors and structures (Long 2001, 13) .
The proposed framework builds on understandings of social reproduction derived from recent feminist scholarship on global householding and social reproduction under capitalism, and feminist and Bourdieusian theory relating to the cultural reproduction of gender and class. In so doing, it brings several important innovations to the study of rural political economy and agrarian change in China. First, it foregrounds issues relating to change in reproductive work, especially care work. To date, most studies of rural political economy in China, as elsewhere, have focused on 'production' and productive labour, and have neglected reproductive work. And yet, as illustrated in the Gingko village case study, reproductive work and the importance that rural families attach to it, have underpinned major changes in the agrarian Chinese economy.
Second, it broadens the focus on class differentiation in Marxist analyses of agrarian change, to include also the production and reproduction of gender and intergenerational power relations and inequalities within rural families, and to examine the critical intersections between class and intra-family differentiation.
Third, the proposed framework highlights the need for a multi-scalar analysis. Such analysis has been missing in most studies of agrarian change in China, which tend either to focus on broad structural changes in the political economy, or take the 'household' as the unit of analysis. In contrast, while beginning with the family, the proposed approach both delves into changing power relations, divisions of labour and patterns of cooperation within families and households, and connects those with shifts in institutions, structures and policies at local, national and global levels.
A fourth, important innovation in the proposed framework is its attention to the sociocultural dimensions of agrarian change. There are two main aspects to this, relating to the social factors shaping rural strategies for reproduction, and to the significance of changing aspirations for family reproduction as drivers of agrarian change. Studies of agrarian change most commonly view households and individuals as 'rational' actors, concerned above all with livelihoods. In contrast, like the householding approach, the proposed framework recognizes that family members' economic decisions and the patterns of work and divisions of labour they adopt are motivated by concerns relating to care, wellbeing, and the reproduction of the family; concerns that go well beyond the need to earn money. It also foregrounds the fact that economic behaviour is shaped by intra-family power relations, and 
Conclusion
In developing this new analytical framework, I have sought to broaden our understanding of rural political economy and agrarian change, opening up the field of investigation to new issues and perspectives, relating to the significance of translocal reproductive work and changing aspirations for family reproduction in shaping rural families' strategies for meeting the challenges and opportunities presented by global capitalism.
This paper focuses on rural China, but at several points also notes similarities in key characteristics of family reproduction and the political economy between rural China and other postsocialist and capitalist contexts in Asia and elsewhere. Much can be learned about rural China, about other political economies, and about global capitalism by undertaking more systematic comparative studies. It is hoped that, building as it does on theoretical approaches adopted by scholars in a range of contexts, the analytical framework developed in this paper provides a basis for such comparative studies.
